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Abstract
This study analyses voters’ response to criminal justice policies by exploiting a natural experi-
ment. The 2006 Italian Collective Pardon Bill, designed and promoted by the incumbent center-left
(CL) coalition, unexpectedly released about one-third of the prison population, creating idiosyncratic
incentives to recidivate across pardoned individuals. Municipalities where resident pardoned individ-
uals had a higher incentive to recidivate experienced a higher recidivism rate. We show that in those
municipalities voters “punished” the CL coalition in the 2008 parliamentary elections. A one standard
deviation increase in the incentive to recidivate – corresponding to an increase of recidivism of 15.9
percent – led to a 3.06 percent increase in the margin of victory of the center-right (CR) coalition
in the post-pardon national elections (2008) relative to the last election before the pardon (2006).
We also provide evidence of newspapers being more likely to report crime news involving pardoned
individuals and of voters hardening their views on the incumbent national government’s ability to
control crime. Our findings indicate that voters keep politicians accountable by conditioning their
vote on the observed effects of public policies.
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1 Introduction
Crime is perceived as a crucial social issue in most Western countries. In the Eurobarometer
survey, for instance, crime ranks among the top five most important problems in several European
countries (Mastrorocco and Minale, 2018).1 Accordingly, there is a widespread belief that criminal
justice policies have a significant impact on voting behavior.2 In particular, elected officials seem
to believe that being soft on crime does not pay off (Levitt, 1997; Huber and Gordon, 2004;
Murakawa, 2014; Lim et al., 2015). Nevertheless, despite the importance of this issue for potential
voters and the observed behavior of elected officials, existing studies on the link between crime
control policies and voters’ behavior are mostly correlational and provide mixed evidence (Hall
2001; Krieger 2011). Thus, we know very little about whether voters respond to crime policies.
This paper exploits an original case study, based on a natural experiment, to examine how
voters respond to criminal justice policies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
to provide evidence concerning voters’ response to crime control policies in a quasi-experimental
setting. More generally, our study is informative on how voters assess policymakers in the presence
of incomplete information, a broader and fundamental question in political economy (Barro, 1973;
Ferejohn, 1986; Fearon, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Besley, 2006; Ashworth, 2012; Duggan
and Martinelli, 2017).
In July 2006, the Italian Parliament unexpectedly passed a collective pardon that sanctioned
the release of 37 percent of the total prison population. The pardon was (mainly) put forward by
the parties of center-left (CL) coalition government elected in the April 2006. According to the
pardon, all the inmates with a residual sentence of less than three years were released in August
2006. The policy was designed in such a way that released prisoners recidivating within a five-year
period would serve an additional sentence equal to their residual sentence at the time of their
release. Therefore, this provision of the bill had a bearing on pardoned individuals’ incentives to
recommit crime after their release from prison since it commuted each month from the (residual)
1Concerns regarding crime are shared by citizens on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Krisberg and
Marchionna (2006), 74% of US citizens are somewhat or very concerned about the problem of crime in their
communities, and 79% are concerned or fearful about the annual release of 700,000 prisoners. See also Enns (2014)
for evidence on public support for tough crime policies.
2According to press accounts, if in 1994 Bill Clinton “hadn’t embraced a ‘tough on crime agenda’ [he] might
never have become—or remained—president”(The Atlantic, May, 2015). Similarly, Michael Dukakis’ defeat in the
1988 US presidential elections is commonly attributed to his “soft on crime” record as Governor of Massachusetts
(The New York Times, July 5, 1988 and the Willie Horton ad).
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original sentence in an extra month of an eventual sentence for future crimes.
Drago et al. (2009) exploit this empirical design to show that individuals’ propensity to recom-
mit a crime is influenced by their remaining sentence at the date of release: a longer residual
sentence strongly discourages future recidivism. The quasi-experimental nature of the variation is
based on the fact that—conditional on the original sentence—the incentive to recidivate (hence-
forth ITR) determined by the residual sentence at the date of release in August 2006, depends
only on the date of entry into prison which is plausibly random (Drago et al., 2009).3
In this paper, we aggregate this individual heterogeneity in the residual sentences at the munic-
ipality level. As we have information on the municipality of residence for the former inmates that
were released, we can rank municipalities according to their inmates’ ITR (the higher the resid-
ual sentence the lower the ITR). We study whether voters punished the governing CL coalition
(that designed and promoted the pardon) in the 2008 national elections, by exploiting municipal
variation in the residual sentence and the resulting different effects of the policy at the local level.
Restricting the sample to municipalities with at least one inmate released, 75 percent have less
than four pardoned individuals and 50 percent have less than two, with bigger cities having a
much larger number of pardoned individuals. Hence, we observe that there is sufficient meaningful
variation in the ITR—which translates into variation in recidivism rates—across the more than
2,000 municipalities where released inmates reside. Overall, while voters were not aware of the
ITR of pardoned individuals as the average residual sentence was not in the public sphere, they
were exposed to different recidivism rates depending on the average residual sentence of released
inmates residing in their municipality.
In estimating the voters’ response to the local effects of the policy, the identifying assumption
is that the ITR in a municipality is exogenous once we control for the average original sentence
of pardoned inmates. In practice, once controlling for the length of the original sentence, the
date of admission to prison (which determines the residual sentence at the date of release) should
not be systematically correlated with voters’ behavior or municipal level characteristics. If this
assumption holds—as several placebo and balancing tests suggest—potential spatially correlated
boom and busts cycles in prison entry should not be correlated with the cross-sectional municipal
3As an example, consider two inmates who committed a crime in 2002 and they were convicted with a sentence
of five years. In August 2006, as they have a residual sentence of less than three years, they are released. Any
difference in their residual sentence (that will sum up to an eventual sentence for a future crime) depends on the
different date of admission in prison in 2002.
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variation or pre-trends in voters’ behavior.4 Hence, this design allows us to exploit a margin of
variation in the effects of the collective pardon which voters might directly relate to the public
policy.
We show that a higher average ITR translates into a worse policy outcome at the municipal
level (a higher recidivism and crime rate) and into a harsher electoral “punishment” of the CL
coalition. In terms of voters’ electoral response, the estimated political cost of being soft on crime is
not negligible: a one standard deviation increase in the ITR at the municipal level— corresponding
to an increase of recidivism of 15.9 percent—resulted in a 3.06 percent increase in the margin of
victory of the center-right (CR) coalition in the post-pardon national elections of 2008 relative to
the pre-pardon elections of 2006.
We also investigate the underlying mechanism linking public policies and electoral behavior
(voters’ information and beliefs). First, we assemble an original dataset of local news stories that
refer to acts of crime committed by former inmates’ and make explicit reference to the fact that
they were released because of the pardon. Second, we match local news to the municipalities to
create a municipal-level measure of exposure to the effects of the pardon. Consistent with the idea
that ITR is a driver of information on the local effects of the policy, we show that newspapers were
more likely to report news on recidivism by pardoned individuals in municipalities where their ITR
was higher. This provides evidence that voters were most likely to receive a negative signal on the
realized effects of the policy in such municipalities.
The higher recidivism rates induced by a higher ITR not only led to more (negative) news on
the effects of the policy but also to an updating of voters’ beliefs on the valence of the center-left
coalition. By collecting data from two independent surveys, we show that voters were more likely
to report a negative assessment on the CL coalition’s ability to control crime in municipalities
where the ITR was higher. Furthermore, in these municipalities voters held more negative views
on the overall competence of the main CL party, the main political supporter of the pardon law.
To further investigate the link between voting behavior and the local effects of the pardon, we
present evidence suggesting that the voters’ inference and electoral response were specific to the
policy at stake. We exploit the circumstance that some of the MPs belonging to the CR coalition
4In fact, we show that the ITR at the municipal level is not correlated with voters’ behavior before the bill or
with observable municipality characteristics, which is consistent with the identifying assumption. Importantly, the
ITR is not correlated with measures of crime waves before the pardon at the municipal level.
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voted in favor of the pardon in 2006. If voters are able to map the effects of the pardon onto MPs’
political behavior, their response to the negative effects of the policy should be less favorable for
the CR coalition in electoral districts where the percentage of its candidates who voted for the
pardon was higher. We show that this was the case. In districts where a higher percentage of CR
candidates voted in favor of the pardon, a higher ITR translated into a smaller increase in the
CR’s winning margin in the 2008 elections (in comparison to the 2006 elections).
Finally, we document that a higher ITR was not associated with individuals being more likely
to perceive crime as the most important issue in Italy or in their local area. This suggests that indi-
viduals correctly associated the collective clemency bill with the recidivism of pardoned individuals
and not with crime in general. In addition, we show that variation in the ITR is uncorrelated with
voters’ behavior in European elections. That is, the local effects of the collective pardon did not
shift voters’ ideological preferences more broadly or lead them to “punish” the CL coalition in
domains where its competence in crime policies was not relevant.
Overall, besides providing evidence on voters’ response to crime policies, our results are in-
formative for the academic debate on voters’ sophistication (Wolfers, 2002; Kendall et al., 2014;
Dal Bo et al., 2018; Hopkins and Pettingill, 2018). Our findings suggest that voters respond to the
observed effects of a public policy, both in terms of beliefs and behavior, in a way that is broadly
consistent with retrospective voting models of electoral accountability.5
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information regarding the
2006 Italian Collective Pardon Bill and its political relevance in the 2008 elections. Section 3
presents the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 reports the effects of the
policy on the recidivism of pardoned individuals at the municipal level and presents the main
results on voters’ electoral response to the effects of the Collective Pardon Bill. Section 6 presents
evidence shedding light on the mechanism behind the main results. Section 7 discusses different
potential interpretations of the empirical results. Section 8 concludes. The online Appendix
presents a retrospective voting model providing a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis.
In addition, it describes in details the database on crime-related news and contains additional
tables and figures which are also discussed in the main text.
5See also Ansolabehere et al. (2014) for evidence that state unemployment in the US robustly correlates with
evaluations of national economic conditions and presidential support.
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2 The 2006 Italian Collective Pardon Bill
Our empirical analysis exploits variations in the incentives to commit a crime that resulted from
the provisions of the collective pardon law approved by the Italian Parliament in July 2006 (Law
241/2006).6 The policy was designed and promoted mainly by the parties of CL government
coalition that was elected in April 2006. It is important to remark that the policy was not part
of the political platform of the CL coalition during the 2006 electoral campaign. The pardon was
approved by both chambers of parliament with a majority of two-thirds of the votes regarding each
article of the law as required by the Italian Constitution for the implementation of an amnesty or
a collective pardon (Sec. II, Art. 79). Hence, some members of the center-right (CR) coalition
voted for the pardon bill—a circumstance that we exploit in the empirical section to test the
accountability mechanism.7 The CL coalition government designed this law and proposed it to the
Italian parliament as one of its first policy measures because of a prison overcrowding emergency—
a problem that is also faced by many goverments across the world, including California and France,
which both recently enacted specific policy interventions to tackle this problem.8 In the 1990s the
incarceration rate in Italy increased steadily while the capacity of prisons remained substantially
stable. Before the collective pardon, the average overcrowding index was 131 inmates to every 100
prison places. As a consequence, since the end of 90s the Catholic Church, leftist parties and civic
associations have campaigned for laws that would alleviate the inhuman and degrading treatment
of prisoners in overcrowded jails.
The bill was approved on July 31, 2006 with immediate effects. The main provisions of the
Collective Pardon Bill were the following. It granted a three-years reduction in the length of
detention for prisoners who were serving their sentence for a crime committed before May 2,
2006. The exclusion of crimes committed after May 2 was announced at the beginning of the
parliamentary debate on the pardon bill, thus preventing strategic behaviors of potential criminals
during the months leading up to the approval of the law. The sentence reduction applied to a
large number of offenses, including property crime, violent crimes, drug trafficking and white-
6Drago et al. (2009) describe in detail the institutional background of the Italian criminal law system and the
process that led to the approval of the bill.
7Some MPs affiliated toForza Italia—one of the parties within the CR coalition—also signed one of the pardon
proposals that was debated in parliament. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.
8See Lofstrom and Raphael (2013) for the case of California and Maurin and Ouss (2009) for the case of France.
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collar crimes.9 Thus, an inmate convicted for a crime committed before May 2, 2006 was eligible
for immediate release from prison as long as his residual sentence was less than three years. As a
result, the prison population dropped from a total of 60,710 individuals on July 31, 2006 to 38,847
on August, 2006.
However, the law did not erase the offense or the punishment: the sentence reduction was
conditional on the inmate’s post-release behavior. All those that benefited from the incarceration
term reduction who recommitted a crime within five years, lost their right to pardon. In the five-
year period following their release from prison, former inmates granted collective pardon faced an
additional expected sentence equal to the residual sentence pardoned by the bill. Thus, as far as the
residual pardoned sentence is as good as random, the conditional sentence suspension provided a
random incentive to commit crime from the perspective of former inmates. The following example
helps to clarify how individual incentives to re-offend are randomized by the law. Consider two
criminals convicted of the same crime. Both inmates had a residual sentence of less than three
years on July 31, 2006. As a consequence of the new law they are both released from prison on
August, 2006. Suppose that the first individual had a residual sentence of one year and that the
second individual entered in prison one year after the first individual. Hence, the second inmate
had a pardoned residual sentence of two years. Over the following five years, for any crime category,
they face a difference in expected sentence of one year. For example, if they commit a burglary
that carries a sentence of three years, the first individual would be sentenced to four years in prison
(there years for the burglary plus one year from the pardoned residual sentence), while the second
individual would be sentenced to five years (three years plus two years of residual sentence). It
is worth noting that the difference in the timing of incarceration comes both from whether or
not a criminal entered prison directly upon the day of apprehension and on when the crime was
committed. We address potential threats to identification in Section 4.
2.1 The Collective Pardon and the 2008 Election
The July 2006 Collective Pardon Bill put forward by the CL coalition proved to be a very prominent
issue for Italian voters up to the next (early) national elections in April 2008. Figure 1 summarizes
9Mafia related crimes, children abuse and terrorism were excluded from the pardon.
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the timing of elections and of the Collective Pardon Bill.10
The high relevance of this issue was the combined result of three main factors. First, the sharp
drop in the incarceration rate created by this policy, as shown by Figure 2, was followed by an
increase in the overall number of crimes committed, as shown by Figure 3 (a 12.4% increase in
crimes between June and December 2006 compared with a 0.35% increase in the previous semester
and with a 1.78% increase in the same semester of the previous year). Second, as illustrated by
Table 1, the majority (51.3%) of the Italian population perceived the Collective Pardon Bill to
had induced a large increase in crime. An additional 27% stated that they perceived the pardon
to have created a positive, yet limited, increase in crime. At the same time, consistently with
the rationale behind our empirical investigation, Table 1 shows a significant heterogeneity in the
perceived effects of the pardon across individuals (even conditional on political ideology). Finally,
as shown by Figure 4, the space devoted to the coverage of crime by national television channels
substantially increased following the rise in crime induced by the collective pardon.11 In short,
the pardon was followed by a substantial increase in crime in the period 2006-2008, the majority
of Italian voters perceived such an effect and, last but not least, news media kept the crime issue
highly salient up to the April 2008 elections. Overall, the high relevance of the Collective Pardon
Bill and of its perceived effects on crime might have been detrimental for the CL coalition for two
primary reasons. As already stated, the fact that the CL coalition took the lead in the design
of the law and was in government at the time of the policy’s approval ensured that the CL was
considered responsible for the effects of such a policy.
Secondly, the “crime issue” is typically owned by rightist parties, since they are the perceived by
voters as the most competent parties in managing it (Petrocik, 1996; Puglisi, 2011). Accordingly,
the CR coalition was the one most likely to gain from an increase in the relevance of crime (Belanger
and Meguid, 2008; Aragones et al., 2015). We discuss these alternative mechanisms in Section 7.
10Notice that, as pointed out Figure 1, the variation in the residual sentence of pardoned individuals exploited
in our data comes exclusively from prisoners released in August 2006 (i.e., prisoners with a residual sentence lower
or equal to 36 months).
11The observed decrease in the number of news on crime between the end of 2007 and June 2008 could be
explained by two factors. First, the collapse of the incumbent government in January 2008 and the consequent
early April 2008 elections increased the space devoted to political news by news programs crowding out news on
other topics (see Eisensee and Stro¨mberg, 2007 for empirical evidence on the crowding-out effects of news pressure
by newsworthy events). Moreover, the observed drop in the number of news on crime in the first semester of 2008,
might also be explained by a sharper decrease in the number of news on crime after the 2008 elections when the
CR government took office, i.e., between April and June 2008 (Demos-Unipolis, 2009).
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3 Data
The empirical analysis uses data from several different datasets. The first dataset provides infor-
mation on the characteristics of the prisoners released following the 2006 Collective Pardon Bill.
The data contains information on the municipality where each prisoner reside, the length of his
residual sentence at the time of release, the length of his original sentence and the type of crime
committed. The data contains information on the entire population of individuals pardoned by
the bill. However, while the information on the municipality of residence of each Italian prisoner
released is informative of his official residence, this is not the case for non-Italian prisoners. That
is, the information on the residency of foreign prisoners is not a reliable proxy of their place of
residence. Hence, we exclude non-Italian individuals from the sample. Accordingly, to reduce
measurement error, we focus only on municipalities where there is at least one Italian pardoned in-
mates resident in the municipality. As a result, the final dataset on pardoned inmates is composed
by 12,355 Italian individuals resident in 2,256 municipalities. That is, around one-third of the mu-
nicipalities in Italy had at least one Italian pardoned individual resident in the municipality. The
summary statistics are reported in Table 2A where we average-out the data on the characteristics
of pardoned individuals at the municipality level. Figure 5 illustrates the geographical distribution
of the (standardized) average ITR of pardoned individuals at the municipal level. This figure shows
a substantial level of variation in the ITR that is not correlated with any regional pattern (for
example higher in the south or in the north or in any particular region). In the following analysis,
we show that conditional on the average original sentence the variation in the ITR is orthogonal to
observable city characteristics. Notice that, if municipalities were to present a very large number
of resident pardoned inmates, we would not have enough variation in our key variable. However,
this is not the case. The 90 percent of municipalities have less than 9 pardoned individuals resident
in the municipality, the 70 percent less than four and the 50 percent less than two.12
We then complement this dataset using electoral data on the 2006 and 2008 parliamentary
elections by the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs, for all municipalities (even the ones with no
pardoned Italian prisoners). This dataset reports information on the votes to political parties in
the 2006 and 2008 elections. Both elections were subject to the same proportional electoral law.13
12Most of the variation in the ITR comes from cities with few released individuals and eligible voters. Figure A1
and A2 show the relationship between the number of voters and the standard deviation in the ITR.
13The 2006 and 2008 parliamentary elections employed a proportional system, 26 electoral districts, and a majority
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As Table 2B shows, both the CR and CL coalitions lost votes in the 2008 elections (with respect
to 2006), with the CR loosing less than the CL. The difference in the margin of victory between
2008 and 2006 was on average 0.07 percentage points. Table 2B summarizes the geographic, socio-
economic and demographic characteristics at the municipal level used in the empirical analysis
(which are provided by the Italian National Statistical Institute, ISTAT).
In order to analyze municipal-level variations in voters’ information on the effects of the collec-
tive pardon, we extrapolated data—from the Factiva database—regarding news on criminal acts
involving pardoned individuals between August 1, 2006 (i.e., when the pardon became effective)
and March 30, 2008 (i.e., the 2008 elections). We then matched news with municipalities to create
a measure of municipal-level exposure of voters to the effects of the pardon. The online Appendix
provides detailed information on the construction of this dataset. In addition, we use survey data
from the Italian National Elections Study Survey (ITANES) in order to gather information on
voters’ issue priority and on their evaluation of the incumbent CL government’s policies on crime.
We also use survey data from the IPSOS Polimetro in order to obtain additional information on
voters’ issue priority (both nationally and in their local area of residence) and on voters’ overall
evaluation of the main CL and CR parties.14 The ITANES dataset is a post-election survey of
around 2,800 individuals interviewed in the month after the 2008 elections. The IPSOS dataset is
composed by several waves of weekly and monthly interviews (for a total of around 28,000 inter-
views) in the period April 2008-December 2008. The summary statistics for this data are reported
in Table 2B.
4 Empirical Strategy: The Pardon Bill as a Natural Ex-
periment
The empirical strategy exploits a unique feature of the Collective Pardon Bill providing that former
inmates re-committing another crime will have to serve the residual sentence at the date of their
release (August 2006) in addition to the new sentence. As we explained in the introduction,
individuals with lower residual sentences are more likely to recidivate compared to individuals
premium granted to the electoral coalition that obtained the higher share of votes at the national level (for the
lower chamber).
14ITANES is research project on electoral behavior of the “Istituto Carlo Cattaneo Research Foundation”
(www.cattaneo.org). IPSOS is one of the largest public opinion polling companies in Italy (http://www.ipsos.it/).
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with higher residual sentences (Drago et al., 2009). Crucially for our study is the source of the
variation in the residual sentence that we exploit in order to identify the effect of local variations
in recidivism. For the same original sentence, inmates have different residual sentences depending
on the date of entry into prison. The empirical analysis exploits the variation at the municipality
level by aggregating this individual heterogeneity. In the next section we discuss the source of
variation in the municipal ITR and the potential threats to identification.
The analysis uses the following main model to assess the impact of the pardon on voters’
electoral response:
∆yi = α + β1ITRi + β2original sentencei + β3Ii + β4Xi + β5Zi + i (1)
where ITR (incentive to recidivate) is defined as 36 minus the average residual sentence, where 36
is the maximum pardoned residual sentence according to the design of the bill.15 The ITR variable
measures the average incentive to recidivate of pardoned individuals residents in municipality i. It
is standardized so that its standard deviation is equal to one. ∆y is the variation in the political
outcome of interest (the margin of victory of the CR coalition with respect to the CL coalition)
between the national elections of 2008 and 2006. The variable original sentence indicates the
average original sentence of former inmates resident in municipality i. Ii represents a dummy
indicating whether there is at least one pardoned individual resident in the municipality.16 Xi is a
vector of controls at the municipal level that includes the average municipal pre-pardon (2004-2005)
crime rate, the average taxable per capita income in 2008 and a set of municipal characteristics in
Census year 2001 (see Table 2B). The last set of variables, Zi, includes the number of pardoned
individuals weighted by municipality population per 1,000 inhabitants and all other observable
demographic and “criminal” characteristics of former inmates resident in municipality i averaged
at the municipal level (i.e., percentage of former inmates that were unemployed, married, with
a primary school degree, a secondary school degree and with a university degree; percentage of
former inmates convicted for drug crimes, for crimes against property and for violent crimes).
For all the municipalities where Ii = 0, that is municipalities with no pardoned individuals, all
15According to this specification, an individual with one month of residual sentence upon release will have an
ITR equal to 35, whereas an individual with a 35 months residual sentence has an ITR equal to one.
16In order to obtain a more homogeneous sample, since all municipalities with at least one pardoned individual
resident in the municipality have 500 inhabitants or more, we exclude all municipalities with no pardoned individuals
having less than 500 inhabitants.
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variables in Zi as well as the original sentence and the ITR variable are set equal to zero.
In specification (1) the estimated coefficient β1 measures the impact of a one standard deviation
increase in the average ITR (which corresponds to 8.2 fewer months of residual sentence) for former
inmates resident in municipality i. The estimation of β1 is obtained by exploiting the variation
in the average residual sentence for all municipalities with at least one pardoned individual. We
estimate the impact of ITR by both excluding and including municipalities with no pardoned
prisoners (i.e., also those with Ii = 0). The inclusion of these municipalities contribute to the
estimation the residual variance of the set of variables Xi that, in turn, it is used to estimate our
coefficient of interest.
Finally, while, later on, we show that our key variable of interest (the ITR) predicts recidivism
at the municipal level (see Table 5), in the main analysis we adopt a conservative approach and
present reduced form estimates instead of using it as an instrument for the crime rate at the local
level since the exclusion restriction could fail. In fact, through general equilibrium effects the
average residual sentence may impact the overall crime rate (e.g. through congestion effects, social
interactions and spillover effects) - as we document later - thereby affecting voters’ welfare and
influencing electoral outcomes (Drago and Galbiati, 2012). This failure of the exclusion restriction
may be exacerbated if the effect of the ITR on the overall crime rate is mediated by the news media
and if this has an impact on the electoral outcome.17 Hence, we consider β1 as the voters’ response
to the effects of the policy implemented with the approval of the bill that includes the direct effect
on recidivism and indirect effects mediated by the overall crime rate and news media.18
4.1 Identification, Balancing Tests and Pre-Trends
Specification (1) is a reduced form model that estimates the effects that the collective pardon had
on electoral outcomes. Our key identifying assumption is that conditional on the average original
sentence of pardoned inmates, the ITR is orthogonal to unobservable characteristics. The key
source of variation is the the date of admission to prison. Indeed, as explained above, conditional
on the original sentence, inmates have different residual sentences—and therefore different ITR—
17At the same time, for the interested reader, Table A13 in the online appendix reports the IV estimates.
18It is important to note that in the presence of inmates from municipality i at risk of recidivism in municipality
j, our coefficient should be interpreted as a lower bound of the causal effect of the ITR on electoral outcomes. If the
mobility patterns are not correlated with the observed average residual sentence, we can interpret this as a classical
measurement error leading to downward biased estimates of the causal effect of the average residual sentence.
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because they entered prison in different dates. Admission to prison is determined by the day of
apprehension (provided that a court decided to hold them in prison) or by the day in which they
were sentenced. At the individual level, the evidence shown in (Drago et al., 2009) is consistent
with the assumption that the date of admission into prison is orthogonal with respect to future
acts of crime (conditional on the original sentence, the date of admission is as good as random).
In our empirical design, since we aggregate the individuals’ residual sentences at the municipal
level, the question is whether or not the municipal level variation in ITR is endogenous to voting
behavior.
The first threat to identification is whether this variation in the residual sentence at the mu-
nicipal level reflects heterogeneity in the crime waves experienced by municipalities and if this
heterogeneity is correlated with voting behavior for reasons that are unrelated the local effects
of the policy. If different inmates coming from the same municipality have similar characteristics
and entered prison in the same period, it is possible that observable and unobservable inmates’
characteristics will be correlated to the ITR. In fact, we do expect this type of pattern if there are
complementarities in crime of similar individuals from the same city (Drago and Galbiati, 2012).
In this case, we might observe some correlation between inmates’ observable characteristics and
their residual sentences when we estimate municipal level regressions. This represents a threat to
identification if these potential micro-level waves of criminals entering prison in the same period
are correlated with voting behavior. In what follows, we address this concern by showing that a
large set of municipal level characteristics are orthogonal to the ITR. More importantly, we show
that different measures of crime and crime waves before the pardon are uncorrelated with the
ITR. Finally, we show the absence of pre-trends, namely the absence of any impact of the ITR on
elections held before 2006.
Tables 3A, 3B and 3C present results from the balancing tests. In these tables we regress the
ITR on each of the variables Xi, conditional on the average original sentence and the indicator
Ii. As expected, the dummy variable Ii and the original sentence are mechanically correlated
with the ITR. The first is positively correlated with the ITR because we set the ITR equal to
zero when Ii = 0. The second is negatively correlated with the ITR since, obviously, a longer
original sentence is associated with a lower ITR (longer residual sentence). Indeed, the residual
sentence is bounded from above and it is always lower than the original sentence. The correlation
between some former inmates’ characteristics (Table A2 in the online Appendix) demonstrates
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the possibility that in some municipalities inmates with similar characteristics and with similar
original sentences enter into prison in the same period.19 However, none of the geographical, socio-
economic or demographic variables in Xi are significantly correlated with the ITR (Tables 3A, 3A
and 3C). In particular, it is worth remarking that the average crime rate in 2004 and 2005 and the
number of pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents are both orthogonal to the ITR. In Table A3
in the online Appendix we show the results our balancing exercise for the crime rate in 2004 and
in 2005 and for the rate of growth of crime between 2004 and 2005 and note that potential crime
waves at the municipal level (reflected in the growth of crime or its levels) are not correlated with
the ITR. Taken together, these results are consistent with our identifying assumption.20
As for the presence of pre-trends, in Table 4 we run a “placebo” specification where we use the
main dependent variable (the sdifferences between the winning margins of the CR coalition) and
the votes per eligible voters of the CR and CL coalitions in the 2006 elections with respect to the
2001 elections, at the municipal level. If the ITR were to pick-up some existing trends in voters’
behavior, Table 4 should show a significant impact of this variable on pre-2008 voting patterns.
Instead, the results are consistent with the average ITR of pardoned individuals released in August
2006 being orthogonal to any pre-trend in the votes to political coalitions in previous elections.
The point estimates are not only imprecisely estimated but, more importantly, are very low in
magnitude (by comparison to the estimates from our main regression, see Table 6).
Another potential threat to identification derives from the observation that besides potential
criminals, local crime is also dependent on the number of police officers present on the streets.
One possible concern is that the supply of police officers responds to potential criminals released
thank to the clemency bill. In addition, if this response varied across municipalities, our coefficient
19However, the effects are modest and the coefficient on the ITR when estimating (1) remains unchanged when
including these variables.
20The potential link between ITR and local crime waves is based on the presumption that the date of a crime
coincides with the date of admission to prison. However, we note that almost all the individuals (99%) in our sample
have been tried and convicted at least at the first instance with an enforceable sentence. For these individuals, the
disposition time (the trial length) crucially affects the date of entry into prison. In this regard, it is important to
point out that the Italian criminal justice system has a high variability in disposition time both across and within
districts. Such heterogeneity is due to factors present at the district level (regarding the efficiency of the court) and
the judge level. Indeed, even within districts we observe significant differences in the length of a trial depending
on the flexibility that each judge has in the organization of her/his working time, as illustrated by Coviello et al.
(2015). This suggests that in the Italian criminal justice system elements such as the efficiency of the district and
the judge in charge of a case, have an important impact on the length of a trial. This reduces the relevance of
the date in which a crime was committed with respect to the incentive to recidivate (i.e., individuals committing a
similar crime on similar dates might enter into prison at quite different times and then end up with rather different
residual sentences at the time of the pardon).
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of interest in Model (1) may pick up the voters’ reaction to the variation in the supply of police
officers on the streets. We note, however, that the supply of police officers is governed at the
national level by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense (for the Polizia di Stato
and theCarabinieri, respectively). There are no significant variations over time in the supply of
these national police forces across municipalities. In fact, the percentage of police officers across
municipalities is historically determined. It is possible to observe some short-run variations, for
example for football matches or political events involving threats to public order. On the other
hand, the local police (Polizia Municipale), which makes a lesser contribution to maintaining
public order, is under the control of the municipality mayor. Yet, variation in the local police
forces requires a long implementation time and it can be possibly related to the local political
cycle. Since we measure the voters’ response to the Collective Clemency Bill enacted by the
Parliament by looking at the national election, we see these concerns as not relevant in our setting.
In Section 5, we show the results by controlling for macro-area and region fixed effects. This
exercise reassures that the results are substantially robust when using variation within regions
where potential changes in police forces may occur.
5 Results
5.1 Policy Outcomes
The first and most immediate effect of the collective pardon was a spike in crime - as documented
in Figure 3. A fraction of this crime that is correlated to the public policy under analysis is due to
the recidivism of pardoned individuals.21 Table 5 shows the results from estimating variations of
equation (1) in which the dependent variable is not the electoral outcome but the recidivism rate at
the municipal level.22 In all of the specifications we cluster standard errors at the provincial level.
When looking at the number of pardoned individuals recommitting a crime after being released
from prison, it is possible to observe that the idiosyncratic individual incentives to recidivate
21As in Drago et al. (2009), the recidivism rate is measured seven months after the release. This is less of a
concern as long as we expect the residual sentence having an effect on recidivism measured two years later. In fact,
the estimates from Mastrobuoni and Rivers (2016) - that we use in Section 5.4 - show that the effect of the residual
sentence is persistent at least up to 17 months after the pardon.
22As both the ITR and the share of recidivists is null in municipalities with no pardoned individuals, we report
results only for the sample of municipalities with at least one pardoned individual
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translates into different recidivism rates at the municipal level. Hence, in municipalities where
the average ITR of pardoned individuals is higher, the collective pardon bill translates into worse
policy effects (higher recidivism rate). The effect is not trivial: taking into account column (3),
a one standard deviation increase in the ITR implies an increase of 1.41 percentage points of
pardoned individuals being re-arrested, which corresponds to a 15.9 percent increase in recidivism
in a municipality with at least one pardoned individual. In Table A4 in the online Appendix, we
also document that the average residual sentence weakly increases the overall crime rate at the
city level. Although the recidivism of pardoned individual arguably represents a small part of the
overall crime, we are able to detect a correlation between our key driver of recidivism and crime.23
5.2 Voters’ Electoral Response
Table 6 illustrates the first set of results. We estimate variations of Equation (1) using ordinary
least squares. The dependent variable is the difference in electoral win margin (in terms of total
votes per eligible voters) of the CR coalition relative to the CL coalition between the 2008 and
the 2006 national elections. As is clear from Table 6 the ITR has a positive effect on the margin
of victory for the CR coalition. This effect is unchanged whether or not we control for inmates’
characteristics (for example, in column (1) and (2)). The coefficients are precisely estimated. In
our preferred specification in column (4), where we consider the sample of all municipalities and
include municipal level controls, a one standard deviation increase in the ITR (around an 8.2
months shorter average residual sentence) leads to a 0.25 percentage points increase in the CR
coalition’s margin of victory, corresponding to a 3.06 percent increase in its margin of victory (we
discuss more in detail these magnitudes in the next section). Table A5 in the online Appendix
reports the coefficients of all the variables included in the analysis.24
The main results are essentially unchanged (larger standard errors but also larger point esti-
mates) when we weight each observation with the number of eligible voters in 2008 (Table A6 in
23Note that the spike in crime documented in Figure 3 takes place in the last semester of 2006 and the first
semester of 2007. As we have yearly data at the municipal level, in Table A4 we report the results regressing crime
rates in 2007.
24This effect is essentially the same when we control for the number of pardoned individuals non-parametrically by
including the number of pardoned individual fixed effects. Identical results are also obtained when we control non-
parametrically for the number of pardoned individuals per capita (by creating discrete intervals for this continuous
variable).
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the online Appendix).25 Overall, the effect appears to be driven by the combined positive effect of
the ITR on the increase in the votes (per eligible voters) of the CR coalition and the negative effect
on the CL coalition (see Tables A8 and A9 in the online Appendix). The coefficients are positive
and statistically significant when we exploit the within-region variation by including macro-area
(the North, Center, South and Islands) fixed effects (Table A10) and region fixed effects (Table
A11). When we exploit within-province variation (Table A12), the coefficient is not statistical-
ly significant for the larger sample (Column 4). However, despite the inclusion of indicators for
macro-areas, regions and provinces that absorb useful variation, we still observe an economically
relevant effect of our driver of recidivism. We also provide the IV estimates of the effect of re-
cidivism on voters’ electoral response in Table A13. In this table we take as the reduced form
the results provided in Table 6 and as the first stage those reported in Table 5. To conclude this
section, we remark that it might be important to investigate whether or not the effect of the ITR is
increases with the number of pardoned individuals per capita. In Section 5 of the online Appendix
we present and discuss this analysis that is complicated by the fact that the ITR is a variable that
is weighted by the number of pardoned individuals resident in a municipality. As we explain in
the online Appendix, we find weak and not compelling evidence that the ITR is increasing with
the number of pardoned individuals resident in a municipality.
5.3 Heterogeneity in Voters’ Response
In this section, we present another important piece of evidence that is consistent with an account-
ability mechanism. As discussed in Section 2, the CL coalition was perceived as being responsible
for proposing and designing the pardon bill. However, some MPs of the CR coalition also voted
in favor of the bills.26 We exploit this circumstance, as such CR MPs might have also been held
accountable by voters for the realized effects of the policy. If an accountability mechanism is at
work, the voters’ response to the effects of the policy should favor less the CR coalition in electoral
districts where the percentage of CR candidate who voted for the pardon was higher.27 In order to
25In Table A7 we control for higher moments of the ITR in a municipality and find that these do not seem to
play any role while the effect of the mean of the ITR remains unaltered.
26According to some policy reports (Eurispes, 2007), some of the MPs of the CR coalition voted in favor of the
bill due to the fact that the pardon was extended to white-collar criminals (e.g., those convicted for financial or
tax-evasion crimes) who accounted for a very limited fraction of released prisoners.
27The electoral law allowed voters to express a preference for a party but not for a specific candidate. Hence,
voters willing to hold a candidate accountable for her/his voting record on the pardon could have done so only by
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test this hypothesis, we gathered data from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding the
identity of all CR candidates in each electoral district for the 2008 elections. We then analyzed
the voting records of each Italian MP regarding the 2006 Collective Pardon Bill and classified each
CR MP according to whether she/he voted in favor or against the bill.28 Finally, we computed
for each electoral district (typically sub-regional entities including hundreds of municipalities), the
percentage of candidates of the main center-right party (i.e., PdL) in the 2008 elections who voted
in favor of the Collective Pardon Bill in July 2006.29 Formally, the model that we estimate is a
variation of model 1:
∆yij = α + α1ITRij + α2original sentenceij + α3Ii + α4Xij + α5Zij
+α6ITRij ×% CR candidates who voted for the pardonj + γj + ij
(2)
where ∆yij is again the difference in the margin of victory of the CR coalition with respect to
the CL coalition between the national elections in 2008 and 2006. Unlike in Model 1, here we
include the dimension of the electoral district j and electoral district effects (γj) that control for
any selection of particular CR candidates into districts.30 In fact, in this case, selection may be
relevant especially for CR candidates who voted for the pardon bill.31
Table 7 presents the results of Model 2 where the coefficient of interest is α6.
32 Table 7 shows
voting against the party she/he belonged to. In particular, it is important to remark that the pardon was approved
by almost all MPs belonging to one of the main CR parties ( Forza Italia, FI) and was opposed by the almost all
the ones belonging to the other main CR partier (Alleanza Nazionale, AN). In the 2008 elections these two parties
merged in a single one (Popolo delle Liberta`, PdL). Hence, voters may have adopted a “simple rule of thumb” by
looking at how many candidates within the 2008 PdL list for their district belonged to either of these two former
parties (FI vs. AN). This was quite straightforward since the former affiliation of candidates to either of these two
parties was reasonably well known to Italian voters.
28MP voting records are available at: http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/stenografici/sed033/
v002.pdf.
29The percentage of CR candidates (of the main party, PdL) in a district who voted for the pardon ranges from
0 up to around 26% (for an average 17.5%, with a standard deviation of 6%). Results are robust to excluding the
districts in the two “tails” of this distribution (i.e., the districts with a percentage equal to zero or above 25).
30We omit from the model the non-interacted variable % CR candidates who voted for the pardon which varies
at the district level and would be absorbed by the electoral district fixed effects.
31Controlling for electoral district fixed effects improves the precision of the estimates for the interaction term.
Without electoral fixed effects the interaction term remains negative but with larger standard errors. In addition,
when we estimate the model by including municipalities with no pardoned individuals, we include an interaction
between the indicator Ii and the percentage of CR candidates who voted for the pardon.
32Our analysis focuses on the lower chamber of the parliament since it is characterized by a larger number of MPs
and of electoral districts. This allows us to exploit a higher degree of heterogeneity across districts when looking at
the differential impact of the percentage of CR candidates who voted in favor of the pardon on voters’ behavior as
in Table 7. We also report the main results for the upper chamber in the online Appendix: Table B2 presents the
results of the same specification as in Table 7, while Table B1 reports the results of the specifications used in Table
6.
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a negative and significant coefficient for this interaction term α6 on the CR win margin between
the 2006 and 2008 elections. This suggests that the higher the percentage of CR candidates in a
district who voted for the pardon, the lower the variation in margin of victory of the CR coalition.
In other words, in districts where more candidates of the CR coalition voted in favor of the pardon,
the CR gained relatively less votes and the CL lost relatively less votes. In terms of magnitudes,
a one standard deviation increase in the ITR at the municipal level implies an increase in the CR
winning margin of 14.2 percent in districts were none of the CR candidates voted in favor of the
pardon. When we consider municipalities with a least one pardoned individual, where the median
percentage of CR MPs who voted for the bill is 0.154, we get the same baseline result as the one
of Table 6.
To summarize, we observe that the CR coalition experienced an increase in its electoral support
relative to the CL, in municipalities where the ITR was higher. Moreover, this effect decreases
with the presence of CR candidates who voted for the pardon.
5.4 Crime & Votes
In this section we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the implied effect of a one standard
deviation increase of the ITR on the votes gained by the CR coalition relative to the CL one.
While such calculation should be taken with caution, it may provide a useful assessment of the
implied magnitude of our effects.33 Column 4 of Table 6, shows that a one standard deviation
increase in the ITR leads to a 3.06 percent increase in the winning margin of the CR coalition
(0.0025 percentage points with respect to an average winning margin of the CR coalition of 0.08
in 2008 elections relative to 2006). Considering an average difference in absolutes votes of 1,702
between the CR and CL elections in 2008, this corresponds to a decrease of 52 votes for each
standard deviation increase in the ITR.
To understand how big a one standard deviation increase in the ITR is in terms former inmates
recidivating, note that the average number of pardoned individual (per 1000 inhabitants) resident
in a municipality is 0.33. Mastrobuoni and Rivers (2016) report an average recidivism rate of
pardoned inmates up to 17 months after the pardon of 0.22.34 This implies that the average number
33We compute this magnitude for the subset of cities with at least one pardoned individual. As we explained in
Section 4, the estimation of our main coefficients of interests is obtained by exploiting the variation in the average
residual sentence for all municipalities with at least one pardoned individual.
34Our data on recidivism only cover a period of seven months following the pardon (i.e., the information on the
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of recidivists per 1000 people is 0.07 (0.33 × 0.22). Table 5 shows that a one standard deviation
increase in the ITR increases the average recidivism rate by 15.9 percent. As a consequence, a
one standard deviation increase in the ITR would lead to an increase in the number of recidivist
equal to 0.0115 (0.159× 0.07). To put it differently, the number of standard deviations increase in
the ITR necessary to induce a 10 percent increase in the number of recidivists is 0.6. Given the
numbers above, this translates into a gain of 33.8 votes for the CR coalition relative to the CL one
(i.e., 0.2% in terms of the overall pool of eligible voters).
6 Additional Evidence: Information and Beliefs
We now provide additional evidence to unmask the link between the idiosyncratic component in
the effects of the policy (the ITR of pardoned individuals) with voters’ observed behavior in the
2008 elections. In particular, we show that a higher average ITR translated into both a higher
probability of bein exposed to crime news involving pardoned individuals at the municipal level
and a more negative evaluation of the incumbent CL government.
Voters’ information. In order to assess the effects of the incentive to recidivate on the infor-
mation available to voters’ about the effects of the pardon, we focus on news about pardoned former
inmates re-committing a criminal act. As explained in the online Appendix, these news stories—
extrapolated from the Factiva database—contain words related to crime categories included in the
pardon (i.e., theft, robbery, extortion, scamming, murder, drug dealing, burglary, beatings, domes-
tic violence, rape, etc.) as well as words immediately identifiable with the collective pardon.35 This
exercise is helpful because voters’ evaluation of the consequences of the collective pardon crucially
depends on the information they receive about the recidivism of pardoned inmates. Table 8 shows
how the pardoned individuals’ ITR relates to news on crimes involving pardoned individuals at the
municipal level. In Columns (1)-(4) of Table 8 we discretize the number of news stories (at least
one news) and use a Probit specification. In Columns (5)-(8) we use the number of news stories
and estimate a Poisson model (Table A14 in the online Appendix, reports OLS estimates for both
dependent variables - at least one news and the number of news). Keeping the number of pardoned
recidivism of pardoned inmates captures only a fraction of the relevant electoral period). Hence, we rely on the
information provided by Mastrobuoni and Rivers (2016) to produce a more accurate figure of the average number
of pardoned individuals who recidivate over the period of interest.
35The online Appendix presents some examples of this type of news.
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individuals per capita present in a municipality and the other characteristics of former inmates
constant, the higher the ITR of pardoned individuals resident in a municipality, the more likely
it is that newspapers report crime-news involving pardoned individuals in the post-pardon period
up to the 2008 elections. Therefore, the different policy effects of the Collective Pardon Bill across
municipalities, due to the idiosyncratic incentives of pardoned individuals to recidivate, translate
into different information regarding the effects of this policy available for voters living in different
municipalities. For example, in Column (2) the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation
increase in our key variable implies a 1.1% higher probability of newspapers reporting at least one
crime-related news story involving pardoned individuals in a given municipality. Although this
effect may not seem large, it is worth remarking that Factiva does not contain the universe of
all local news sources available to voters. At the same time, the news media is not necessarily
the only channel of information on the effects of the public policy. For example, voters may also
receive a private signal via a direct experience (for example, being a victim of a crime committed
by a pardoned individual) or an indirect one (knowing someone who had such a direct experience).
While we cannot clearly test these potential additional channels, we expect the direction of the
effects to resemble the one observed for crime-related news reported by media outlets.
Voters’ posterior beliefs. After having documented that the pardoned individuals’ average ITR
affects recidivism and media coverage of their crimes at the municipal level, we now look at how the
average ITR affects voters’ perceptions on the CL coalition. Using the responses to the ITANES
post-electoral survey, in Table 9 we look at the effects of the ITR on voters’ perceptions of both
the CR and CL coalitions’ competences in tackling crime. In Column (1) we investigate whether
the incentive to recommit a crime at the municipality level led voters to consider crime the most
important issue that the government should face. From the full sample of about 2,800 individuals,
there is no compelling evidence that our margin of variation translated into a general increase in
the relevance of crime (a finding that we use later to interpret the mechanism).
The survey asks specific questions on the ability of the CL and CR to deal with crime to
the sub-sample of individuals (about 350) that responded yes to the first question (that crime
is the main issue government should face). The results in Column (2)-(4) of Table 9 show that
individuals living in municipalities where pardoned individuals have a higher average ITR are
more likely to report a worse evaluation of the CL incumbent government’s crime control policies
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and the ability of the CL to deal with crime in general. The coefficient reported in Column (2),
for example, implies a 1.66 percentage points (4.14%) higher probability of individuals reporting
an overall negative evaluation of the CL coalition’s crime control interventions following a one
standard deviation increase in the ITR.
We find evidence in line with Table 9 from another dataset (IPSOS surveys). We first assess
whether the incentive to recommit a crime is associated with an increase of the relevance of crime
from the voters’ perspective, both in Italy and in the local area where they live. From columns
(1) and (2) of Table 10 that reports the results, we find again that the incentive to recommit a
crime does not increase the relevance that voters attach to crime. Next, we are able to investigate
whether the negative perception of the CL incumbent in dealing with crime (Table 9) is also
associated with a more negative evaluation of the CL in general.36 Table 10 shows that when the
ITR is higher, voters are also more likely to negatively evaluate the main CL party (the Partito
Democratico).37
7 Interpretations of the Results
In the previous sections we documented voters’ response to criminal justice policies and the mech-
anisms underlying this response. In this section, we discuss how this evidence might be related to
a general theoretical framework of voters’ response to the effects of public policies. The key mech-
anism underlying modern theories of electoral accountability which is based on forward-looking
retrospective voting (Fearon, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Besley, 2006; Besley and Prat,
2006; Ashworth, 2012; Ashworth et al., 2016) relies on two main elements. First, a politician’s
past action should provide information about her future behavior such that voters should be able
to infer information on politician’s quality from policy outcomes. Second, voters should condition
their electoral behavior on such information (i.e., voters should respond to the observed effects of
public policies). The results presented in the paper are consistent with this mechanism. In the on-
36The IPSOS database contains a series of repeated cross-sections spanning from April 2008 to December 2008.
We consider all individuals interviewed within this period and control for date of the interview fixed effects. The
frequency with which the question on the relevance of the crime issue was asked is lower than the one regarding the
valuation of the main CL party. This explains the different number of observations in Columns (1) and (2) with
respect to Columns (3) and (4).
37Table 9 and 10 report the marginal effects from a Probit model. In Tables A15 and A16 in the online Appendix
we report the marginal effects from ordinary least squares.
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line Appendix we present a retrospective probabilistic voting model linking voters and politicians
consistent with our results in the context of our empirical design. Municipalities where the average
ITR of resident pardoned individuals was higher experienced a higher recidivism rate (Table 5). In
these municipalities, the CL coalition experienced a worse electoral performance relative to the CR
one (Table 6). A higher ITR also translated in newspaper being more likely to report crime-related
news involving pardoned individuals (Table 8). Hence, this suggests that voters living in different
municipalities had different probabilities of receiving a negative private signal on the policy effects
of the pardon. Most importantly, these probabilities were correlated with the idiosyncratic incen-
tives to recidivate created by the design of the policy. The evidence concerning voters’ evaluation
of the CL incumbent government’s crime policies (Table 9) and the overall perceived quality of
the main CL party (Table 10), is consistent with a mechanism where voters update their beliefs
on the incumbent government’s quality (type) according to the observed effects of the policy.
Alternatively, our basic results (Table 6) might be explained by multi-dimensional voting.
The multi-dimensional voting interpretation implies that an increased relevance of crime might
have favored CR parties, given that they are typically perceived as the most competent on this
issue (Petrocik, 1996; Puglisi, 2011). As discussed in Section 2, the Collective Pardon Bill was
a very relevant political issue up to the 2008 elections. If the collective pardon and its effects
translated into a general increase in the relevance of crime, our results could be then explained by
a salience-driven increase in the support for CR parties (this is a mechanism suggested by models of
multi-dimensional voting Belanger and Meguid, 2008; Aragones et al., 2015). However, while this
mechanism is consistent with the baseline results, it does not seem to square with three other pieces
of evidence. First, as shown by Table 7, the gain that the CR coalition obtained in municipalities
where the (negative) effects of the pardon were more relevant was lower in districts where more
CR candidates voted in favor of the pardon. Hence, the relevance of the crime issue induced by the
collective pardon did not translated in an overall higher support for the CR. Rather, this higher
support was conditional on the past stance of CR candidates with respect to such a policy. In
addition, the evidence from the two survey datasets analyzed in Section 6 does not seem to imply
any impact of the ITR on the probability of voters perceiving crime to be the most important
issue either in Italy as a whole (Table 9 and Table 10) or in their municipality of residence (Table
10). Finally, if the increase in the relevance of crime favored right-wing parties in general, the ITR
should influence not only national parliamentary elections but also other elections. Table A17 in
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the online Appendix tests this implication. The results show that the ITR did not have any impact
on voter behavior in European elections (for 2009 compared to 2004). Hence, it does not seem
that CR parties experienced an overall political gain in municipalities where the realized effects of
the policy were likely to be worse.
8 Conclusions
While politicians and elected officials exert a lot of effort to demonstrate their commitment to
crime control, very little is known about how voters respond to crime policies. Do voters reward
“tough on crime” politicians independently from the actual effects of their policies or do they
respond to the observable effects of their actions on crime rates?
This paper provided causal evidence about voters’ reaction to the consequences of a criminal
justice policy intervention. Our study has analyzed how voters responded to the local consequences
of the 2006 Collective Pardon Bill in Italy. The Italian case-study has a series of attractive features
since it allowed us to exploit a unique national level natural experiment. Indeed, the collective
pardon implemented by this bill implies random variation in the consequences of the policy at the
municipality level. While the approval of the collective pardon itself may have given a uniform
signal at the national level about the attitudes of the ruling CL coalition, the empirical evidence
shows that idiosyncratic incentives to recidivate across pardoned individuals (created by the design
of the bill) lead to heterogeneous policy effects across municipalities. Municipalities where the
average incentive to recidivate of resident pardoned individuals was higher, experienced a higher
recidivism rate. At the same time, a higher incentive to recidivate at the municipal level led
to newspapers being more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals and voters
hardening their views on the CL coalition. Exploiting these features of the collective pardon bill,
our main results provide causal evidence of voters holding politicians accountable for their policy
choices. Specifically, our main results show that, conditional on the number of released prisoners
resident in a municipality and their crime profile including the average original sentence, a higher
incentive to recidivate in a municipality translates into a harsher electoral “punishment” of the
CL coalition.
Besides providing evidence about the electoral payoffs of effective crime policies, to the best
of our knowledge, our empirical analysis is among the few existing studies providing direct evi-
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dence about voters holding politicians accountable for the consequences of their policies (Ferraz
and Finan, 2008; Casaburi and Troiano, 2016). Our analysis suggests that voters receive private
signals and hold beliefs on incumbent politicians that are consistent with the effects of their public
policies. Ultimately, voters keep incumbent politicians accountable by conditioning their vote on
the observed effects of public policies.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Perceived overall effects of the collective pardon on crime
Center-Left Center-Right Independent/ All
Voters Voters abstainers Voters
Large increase in crime 29.7% 66.7% 52.1% 51.3%
Limited increase in crime 38.2% 22.0% 25.0% 27.4%
No increase in crime 26.7% 8.2% 11.4% 14.2%
Does not know/Does not answer 5.3% 3.1% 11.4% 7.1%
Notes. The data are drawn from a survey (N=1307) representative of the Italian population aged 16 and
above. The data reports the percentage response by type of answer and by voter’s political ideology to
the question ”In your opinion, has the collective pardon lead to an increase in crime in Italy”. Source:
Osservatorio sul Capitale Sociale. Demos & Pi, June 2007.
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Table 2A: Summary statistics: Pardoned individuals (municipal level)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incentive to recidivate (ITR) 2256 2.51 1 .12 4.26
Average original sentence 2256 40.56 29.57 2 254
Mean age 2256 40.26 8.48 20 78
% employed 2256 .26 .37 0 1
% married 2256 .27 .36 0 1
% primary education 2256 .71 .38 0 1
% secondary education 2256 .07 .21 0 1
% college education 2256 .01 .08 0 1
% convicted for drug crimes 2256 .3 .37 0 1
% convicted for property crimes 2256 .47 .41 0 1
% convicted for violent crimes 2256 .13 .28 0 1
% convicted for other crimes 2256 .02 .1 0 1
Pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents 2256 .33 .32 .02 4.39
Notes. The table reports summary statistics on the individuals released in each city with at least one individuals. Number reported
are at the city level.
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Table 2B: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
City with at least one pardoned individual 7159 .32 .46 0 1
Municipal area (squared km) 7159 39.59 52.02 .2 1307.7
Latitude 7159 43.27 2.62 35.5 47.04
Longitude 7159 11.74 2.75 6.7 18.49
Landlocked municipality 7159 .91 .29 0 1
Montaneous municipality 7159 1.88 .95 1 3
Crimes per capita pre-pardon (2005&2004) 7159 .01 .01 0 .33
Mean taxable income per capita (2008) 7159 10309.79 3254.3 3030.83 30545.7
Private sector employees per capita (2001) 7159 .21 .17 .01 3.06
Municipal unemployment rate (2001) 7159 .11 .09 0 .51
Municipal population (2001) 7159 7876.69 41749.45 500 2546804
Share of population older than 65 (2001) 7159 .2 .06 .06 .55
Share of population between 20-34 (2001) 7159 .21 .02 .1 .29
Share of population with diploma laurea (2001) 7159 .28 .06 .07 .62
At least one news on crime & collective pardon 7159 .06 .24 0 1
∆ Win Margin 2006-2008 C.Right vs. C.Left 7159 .07 .07 -.3 .6
∆ Votes per eligible voters 2006-2008 C. Right 7159 -.04 .04 -.31 .27
∆ Votes per eligible voters 2006-2008 C. Left 7159 -.11 .05 -.54 .14
Crime main political issue gov. should face 2853 .12 .33 0 1
Incumbent gov. poorly managed crime 350 .4 .49 0 1
Center-left best suited to deal with crime 350 .07 .26 0 1
Center-right best suited to deal with crime 350 .49 .5 0 1
Negative valuation main C-Left party 27965 .14 .35 0 1
Positive valuation main C-Right party 28116 .11 .31 0 1
Crime main issue in the municipality 3734 .07 .26 0 1
Crime main issue in Italy 3734 .12 .32 0 1
Notes. The table reports summary statistics on all the cities in our sample. Number reported are at the city level.
30
Table 3A: Balancing tests: geographical characteristics of the municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive
to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate










Average original sentence - pardoned -0.0150*** -0.0151*** -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0150***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
City with at least one pardoned invididual 3.1181*** 3.1163*** 3.1169*** 3.1197*** 3.1168***
(0.0485) (0.0479) (0.0482) (0.0473) (0.0478)
Observations 7,159 7,159 7,159 7,159 7,159
R-squared 0.8488 0.8489 0.8488 0.8488 0.8488
Notes. Entries are coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the incentive to recidivate regressed on each of the
variables Xi of model (1), conditional on the average original sentence and the indicator Ii (city with at least one pardoned individual).
Models estimated are with OLS. Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3B: Balancing tests: socio-economic characteristics of the municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive
to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate
Crimes per capita in 2005 & 2004 0.2342
(0.4869)
Pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents 0.0317
(0.0599)
Taxable income per capita (2008) -0.0000
(0.0000)
Private sector employees per capita, in 2001 -0.0064
(0.0388)
Municipal unemployment rate, in 2001 0.0658
(0.0801)
Average original sentence - pardoned -0.0150*** -0.0151*** -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0151***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
City with at least one pardoned invididual 3.1172*** 3.1078*** 3.1175*** 3.1176*** 3.1159***
(0.0482) (0.0546) (0.0485) (0.0484) (0.0477)
Observations 7,159 7,159 7,159 7,159 7,159
R-squared 0.8488 0.8488 0.8488 0.8488 0.8488
Notes. Entries are coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the incentive to recidivate regressed
on each of the variables Xi of model (1), conditional on the average original sentence and the indicator Ii (city with at
least one pardoned individual). Models estimated are with OLS. Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3C: Balancing tests: demographic characteristics of the municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive
to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate to recidivate
Municipal population, in 2001 0.0000
(0.0000)
Share of population older than 65, in 2001 -0.0490
(0.1176)
Share of population between 20-34, in 2001 0.0643
(0.3181)
Share of population with diploma laurea, in 2001 0.0979
(0.1019)
Average original sentence - pardoned -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0150***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
City with at least one pardoned individual 3.1152*** 3.1158*** 3.1166*** 3.1151***
(0.0485) (0.0472) (0.0474) (0.0486)
Observations 7,159 7,159 7,159 7,159
R-squared 0.8488 0.8488 0.8488 0.8488
Notes. Entries are coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the incentive to recidivate regressed
on each of the variables Xi of model (1), conditional on the average original sentence and the indicator Ii (city with at
least one pardoned individual). Models estimated are with OLS. Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 4: Placebo
∆ Win Margin 2006-2001
Center-right vs. Center-left
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive to recidivate -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Pardoned individuals controls NO YES YES YES
Municipal level controls NO NO YES YES
Only municipalities with at least one pardoned YES YES YES NO
Observations 2,252 2,252 2,252 7,139
R-squared 0.0098 0.0461 0.1508 0.1549
Notes. Entries are coefficients from the equation model (1) estimated with OLS where the dependent variable
is the difference in the margin of victory of the CR coalition with respect to the CL coalition between the
national elections in 2006 and 2001. Pardoned individuals control include: number of pardoned individuals
per 1,000 residents in the municipality, average length of original sentence, average age, percentage of par-
doned individuals that are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals with primary, secondary and college
education, percentage of pardoned individuals convicted for drug, property, violent or other types of crime;
Municipal level controls include: municipal area, latitude, longitude, dummy for landlocked municipality,
indicator of montaneous or partially montaneous municipality, resident population, share of population with
diploma laurea, share of population over 65, share of population 20-34, private sector employees per capita,
municipal unemployment rate (in census year 2001), mean taxable income per capita (2008) and crime rate
pre-pardon (average between 2004-2005). Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 5: Incentive to Recidivate and Recidivism
Share of Recidivists
(1) (2) (3)
Incentive to recidivate 0.0159*** 0.0142** 0.0141**
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Pardoned individuals controls NO YES YES
Municipal level controls NO NO YES
Only municipalities with at least one pardoned YES YES YES
Observations 2,256 2,256 2,256
R-squared 0.0063 0.0369 0.0419
Notes. Entries are coefficients from the equation model (1) estimated with OLS where the dependent variable
is the share of released inmates recommitting a crime (recidivism). Pardoned individuals control include:
number of pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents in the municipality, average length of original sentence,
average age, percentage of pardoned individuals that are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals
with primary, secondary and college education, percentage of pardoned individuals convicted for drug,
property, violent or other types of crime; Municipal level controls include: municipal area, latitude, longitude,
dummy for landlocked municipality, indicator of montaneous or partially montaneous municipality, resident
population, share of population with diploma laurea, share of population over 65, share of population 20-
34, private sector employees per capita, municipal unemployment rate (in census year 2001), mean taxable
income per capita (2008) and crime rate pre-pardon (average between 2004-2005). Standard errors clustered
at the provincial level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 6: Voters’ Electoral Response
∆ Win Margin 2008-2006
Center-right vs. Center-left
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive to recidivate 0.0030** 0.0030** 0.0029** 0.0025**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Pardoned individuals controls NO YES YES YES
Municipal level controls NO NO YES YES
Only municipalities with at least one pardoned YES YES YES NO
Observations 2,256 2,256 2,256 7,159
R-squared 0.0200 0.0785 0.2306 0.1217
Notes. Entries are coefficients from the equation model (1) estimated with OLS where the dependent variable
is the difference in the margin of victory of the CR coalition with respect to the CL coalition between the
national elections in 2008 and 2006. Pardoned individuals control include: number of pardoned individuals
per 1,000 residents in the municipality, average length of original sentence, average age, percentage of par-
doned individuals that are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals with primary, secondary and college
education, percentage of pardoned individuals convicted for drug, property, violent or other types of crime;
Municipal level controls include: municipal area, latitude, longitude, dummy for landlocked municipality,
indicator of montaneous or partially montaneous municipality, resident population, share of population with
diploma laurea, share of population over 65, share of population 20-34, private sector employees per capita,
municipal unemployment rate (in census year 2001), mean taxable income per capita (2008) and crime rate
pre-pardon (average between 2004-2005). Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 7: Voters’ Electoral Response - Heterogeneity
∆ Win Margin 2008-2006
Center-right vs. Center-left
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive to recidivate 0.0122*** 0.0124*** 0.0112*** 0.0116***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Incentive to recidivate × (% CR cand. who voted for pardon) -0.0590*** -0.0589*** -0.0504*** -0.0535***
(0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0162) (0.0159)
Municipality with at least one pardoned individual 0.1685***
× (% CR cand. who voted for pardon) (0.0545)
Pardoned individuals controls NO YES YES YES
Municipal level controls NO NO YES YES
Only municipalities with at least one pardoned YES YES YES NO
Observations 2,256 2,256 2,256 7,159
R-squared 0.3668 0.3790 0.4458 0.3754
Notes. Entries are coefficients from the equation model (2) estimated with OLS where the dependent variable
is the difference in the margin of victory of the CR coalition with respect to the CL coalition between the
national elections in 2008 and 2006. Pardoned individuals control include the interaction between the number
of pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents in the municipality, average length of original sentence, average
age, percentage of pardoned individuals that are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals with primary,
secondary and college education, percentage of pardoned individuals convicted for drug, property, violent
or other types of crime; Municipal level controls include: municipal area, latitude, longitude, dummy for
landlocked municipality, indicator of montaneous or partially montaneous municipality, resident population,
share of population with diploma laurea, share of population over 65, share of population 20-34, private
sector employees per capita, municipal unemployment rate (in census year 2001), mean taxable income per
capita (2008) and crime rate pre-pardon (average between 2004-2005). Standard errors clustered at the
provincial level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 8: Incentive to recidivate & news on crime
At least one news on Number of news on
crime & collective pardon crime & collective pardon
in the municipality in the municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incentive to recidivate 0.0018** 0.0018** 0.0016* 0.0007* 0.0119* 0.0135** 0.0193** 0.0178**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0098) (0.0088)
Pardoned individuals controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Municipal level controls NO YES YES NO YES YES YES NO
Only municipalities with at least one pardoned YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO
Observations 2,256 2,256 2,256 7,159 2,255 2,255 2,255 7,156
Notes. Marginal effects from a Probit model evaluated at the sample mean of all other variables are reported in columns
(1)-(4), where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to zero if there is at least one local news on crime and collective
pardon in a municipality and zero otherwise. Coefficients from a Poisson model are reported in columns (5)-(8), where the
dependent variable is the number of local news on crime and collective pardon in a municipality. Pardoned individuals
control include: number of pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents in the municipality, average length of original sentence,
average age, percentage of pardoned individuals that are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals with primary,
secondary and college education, percentage of pardoned individuals convicted for drug, property, violent or other types of
crime; Municipal level controls include: municipal area, latitude, longitude, dummy for landlocked municipality, indicator
of montaneous or partially montaneous municipality, resident population, share of population with diploma laurea, share of
population over 65, share of population 20-34, private sector employees per capita, municipal unemployment rate (in census
year 2001), mean taxable income per capita (2008) and crime rate pre-pardon (average between 2004-2005). Standard errors
clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 9: Issue Priority & Perceived Competence of Political Coalitions (ITANES )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime most C-Left gov. C-Left C-Right
important issue dealt very bad best suited to best suited to
gov. should face with crime deal with crime deal with crime
Incentive to recidivate -0.0006 0.0171** -0.0008 0.0021
(0.0016) (0.0071) (0.0006) (0.0081)
Pardoned individuals controls YES YES YES YES
Municipal level controls YES YES YES YES
Individual level controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,826 347 347 347
Pseudo R-squared 0.069 0.229 0.477 0.203
Notes. Marginal effects from a Probit model evaluated at the sample mean of all other variables are report-
ed. Individual level controls include: age, gender, religiosity level, marital status, employment status, self
declared left-right political position, frequency of newspaper readership and whether the most viewed TV
news channel belongs to the Mediaset media group (owned by the leader of the center-right coalition, Silvio
Berlusconi). Pardoned individuals control include: number of pardoned individuals per 1,000 residents in
the municipality, average length of original sentence, average age, percentage of pardoned individuals that
are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals with primary, secondary and college education, percentage
of pardoned individuals convicted for drug, property, violent or other types of crime; Municipal level controls
include: municipal area, latitude, longitude, dummy for landlocked municipality, indicator of montaneous or
partially montaneous municipality, resident population, share of population with diploma laurea, share of
population over 65, share of population 20-34, private sector employees per capita, municipal unemployment
rate (in census year 2001), mean taxable income per capita (2008) and crime rate pre-pardon (average be-
tween 2004-2005). Observation are weighted according to the sample political weights provided by ITANES
(2008). Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***, which report the results of the test of
the underlying coefficient from the Probit model being 0.
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Table 10: Valuation of Political Parties and Issue Priority (IPSOS )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime Crime Negative Positive
main issue main issue valuation valuation
in municipality in Italy main CL party main CR party
Incentive to recidivate -0.0000 0.0005 0.0019** 0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Pardoned individuals controls YES YES YES YES
Municipal level controls YES YES YES YES
Individual level controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,719 3,719 27,853 28,004
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.122 0.0740 0.172
Notes. Marginal effects from a Probit model evaluated at the sample mean of all other variables are reported.
Individual level controls include: age, gender, religiosity level, employment status, self declared left-right po-
litical position, graduate degree. Pardoned individuals control include: number of pardoned individuals per
1,000 residents in the municipality, average length of original sentence, average age, percentage of pardoned
individuals that are employed, percentage of pardoned individuals with primary, secondary and college e-
ducation, percentage of pardoned individuals convicted for drug, property, violent or other types of crime;
Municipal level controls include: municipal area, latitude, longitude, dummy for landlocked municipality,
indicator of montaneous or partially montaneous municipality, resident population, share of population with
diploma laurea, share of population over 65, share of population 20-34, private sector employees per capita,
municipal unemployment rate (in census year 2001), mean taxable income per capita (2008) and crime rate
pre-pardon (average between 2004-2005). Observation are weighted according to the sample political weights
provided by IPSOS. The econometric specification includes fixed effects for the date of the interview. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***, which report the results of the test of the underlying
coefficient from the Probit model being 0.
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Figure 1: Timing of Elections and Collective Pardon Bill
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Figure 2: Incarceration rate
Notes: The figure illustrates the variation in the incarceration rate (i.e., per 100,000
people) in Italy before and after the collective pardon bill.
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Notes: The figure illustrates the variation in the total number of crimes per 100,000
people in Italy between the first semester of 2005 and the first semester of 2008.























































Notes: The figures illustrates the variation in the number of news on crime (on the
main Italian national TV channels) between the first semester of 2005 and the first
semester of 2008. (Source: “Indagine sulla Sicurezza in Italia, 2009, UNIPOLIS”).
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Figure 5: Geographical distribution of the average incentive to recidivate of pardoned individuals
(standardized)
Notes. The figure illustrates the geographical distribution of the (standardized) average incentive to
recidivate of pardoned individuals at the municipal level. A one unit increase corresponds to a one
standard deviation increase in the incentive to recidivate (i.e., around 8.2 months less of residual
sentence).
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